

[4]

EXHIBIT A

INVESTIGATION BY LT. COLONEL HENRY C. CLAUSEN, JAGD, FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR; SUPPLEMENTARY TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

1. Joint Resolution of the Congress, 13 June 1944, directing the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, severally, to conduct investigations of Pearl Harbor.
2. Public report of Secretary of War regarding Pearl Harbor disaster, 1 December 1944.
3. Order of Secretary of War, 23 November 1944, directing Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, to conduct supplementary investigation.
4. Memorandum of The Judge Advocate General, 5 December 1944, concerning unexplored leads in Pearl Harbor Investigation.
5. Memorandum of the Secretary of War, 6 February 1945, to all Army personnel concerned relative to investigation to be made by Major Henry C. Clausen.
6. Letter to Secretary of the Navy from the Secretary of War, 6 February 1945, concerning investigation to be made by Major Henry C. Clausen.
7. Letter to Secretary of War from the Secretary of the Navy, 10 February 1945, in reply to letter 6 February 1945.
8. Memorandum of the Secretary of War for The Adjutant General, 3 March 1945, requesting travel orders for Major Henry C. Clausen.
9. Movement Orders for Major C. Clausen, 14 March 1945.
10. Memorandum of the Secretary of War to the Commanding General, Pacific Ocean Areas, 24 March 1945, relative to investigation being made by Major Henry C. Clausen.
11. Memorandum of the Secretary of War to the Commanding General, Southwest Pacific Theater, 24 March 1945, relative to investigation being made by Major Henry C. Clausen.
12. Memorandum to Major Duckett, ASF, P&O, 24 March 1945, requesting change in movement orders.
13. Wire from The Adjutant General, 27 March 1945, to Commanding Officer, 1504 AAFBU, Fairfield, California, advising of change in movement orders of Major Henry C. Clausen.
- [5] 14. Memorandum of Secretary of War for The Adjutant General, 24 May 1945, requesting travel orders for Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen.
15. Movement orders for Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, 25 May 1945.
16. Letter of the Secretary of War to the Secretary of the Navy, 28 May 1945, concerning investigation.
17. Memorandum of the Secretary of War for The Adjutant General, 7 August 1945, requesting change in movement orders of Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen.
18. Amendment of movement orders of Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, 11 August 1945.
19. Public report of Secretary of War regarding the Pearl Harbor disaster, 29 August 1945.

[6]

[PUBLIC LAW 339—78TH CONGRESS]

[CHAPTER 247—2D SESSION]

[S. J. Res. 133]

JOINT RESOLUTION

To extend the statute of limitation in certain cases.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That effective as of December 7, 1943, all statutes, resolutions, laws, articles, and regulations, affecting the possible prosecution of any person or persons, military or civil, connected with the Pearl Harbor

catastrophe of December 7, 1941, or involved in any other possible or apparent dereliction of duty, or crime or offense against the United States, that operate to prevent the court martial, prosecution, trial or punishment of any person or persons in military or civil capacity, involved in any matter in connection with the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, or involved in any other possible or apparent dereliction of duty, or crime or offense against the United States, are hereby extended for a further period of six months, in addition to the extension provided for in Public Law 208, Seventy-eighth Congress.

SEC. 2. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are severally directed to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the catastrophe described in section 1 above, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts may justify.

Approved June 13, 1944.

[7] WAR DEPARTMENT

BUREAU OF PUBLIC RELATIONS

PRESS BRANCH

Tel. —RE 6700, Brs. 3425 and 4860

DECEMBER 1, 1944.

Immediate Release

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF WAR

The following is the text of a statement by the Honorable Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War:

By Joint Resolution of the Congress, approved June 13, 1944, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy were severally directed to proceed with an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts might justify. In order to meet the wishes of Congress as expressed in this resolution, I have conducted such an investigation. In order to assist me to this end, there was appointed by order dated July 8, 1944, a Board of three general officers which was directed "to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on 7 December 1941 and to make such recommendations as it might deem proper."

This Army Pearl Harbor Board has conducted an extensive and painstaking investigation. It has held hearings in Hawaii, San Francisco, and Washington. It has examined a total of 151 witnesses and received many exhibits. I have read its report and reviewed the recorded evidence. The Judge Advocate General of the Army, at my direction, has also examined the report and the record and has given me fully the benefit of his views.

I recognize the importance to any individual concerned of having a decision taken as to what, if any, action is to be instituted against him and, after weighing all the considerations, I am clear that the public interest as well as justice and fairness will best be served by a statement of my present conclusions. So far as they now may be made public, consonant with the public interest, my conclusions are as follows:

The Army Pearl Harbor Board, although it recommended no disciplinary or other action, concluded that there were several officers in the field and in the War Department who did not perform their duties with the necessary skill or exercise the judgment which was required under the circumstances. On the recorded evidence, I agree with some but not all of the Board's conclusions.

So far as the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department is concerned, I am of the opinion that his errors of judgment were of such a nature as to demand his relief from a Command status. This was done on January 11, 1942, and in itself is a serious result for any officer with a long record of excellent service, and conscientious as I believe General Short to be. In my judgment, on the evidence now recorded, it is sufficient action.

Furthermore, I am satisfied that proper steps were taken to correct such inadequacies of either personnel or organization as were shown to exist either in the War Department or in the field at the time of the Pearl Harbor disaster. My conclusion is that under all the circumstances the evidence now recorded does not warrant the institution of any further proceedings against any officer in the Army.

In accordance with the opinion of the Judge Advocate General, I have decided that my own investigation should be further continued until all the facts are made as clear as possible and until the testimony of every witness in possession of material facts can be obtained, and I have given the necessary [8] directions to accomplish this result. Some of the testimony may be much delayed where witnesses are engaged in combat in active Theaters of Operation. My present decision will be reviewed when the investigation has been finally completed.

Finally, I am absolutely clear that it would be highly prejudicial to the successful prosecution of the war and the safety of American lives to make public during the war the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board or the record on which it is based.

STATEMENT AS TO COLONEL THEODORE WYMAN, JR., AND CERTAIN OTHERS

I have today made a separate statement of my conclusion on the basis of the evidence now recorded not to institute further proceedings against any officer of the Army in respect to the Pearl Harbor disaster.

The Military Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, by a report of June 14, 1944, called attention to certain relationships of Hans Wilhelm Rohl to military construction in Hawaii under the direction of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., District Engineer, and indicated that this may have contributed to the Pearl Harbor catastrophe. Accordingly, the phases of the Committee report bearing thereon were referred to the Army Pearl Harbor Board for further investigation.

I have reviewed the results of this investigation. I do not find from this review that the Pearl Harbor disaster was in any way contributed to or caused by any alleged misconduct, neglect or disloyalty on the part of Rohl, the Hawaiian Constructors, the organization with which he was connected, Colonel Wyman, or others directing construction activities in Hawaii, and I do not find that there is any evidence that Rohl or anyone else directing such construction gave any information to the enemy.

As to certain other alleged misconduct and neglect of Colonel Wyman and others in construction matters, I have referred the question of the commencing of any proceedings to the Under Secretary of War and the Judge Advocate General.

Distribution: Aa, Af, B, Da, Dd, Dm, N.

5:00 P. M.

SECRET

[9]

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington, 23 November 1944.

Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Subject: Pearl Harbor Investigation.

In connection with the recent report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, a number of unexplored leads have suggested themselves which require investigation. I have directed that this investigation be undertaken by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD.

You are directed to give Major Clausen access to all records, documents, and information to your Division, whether of secret or top secret nature and to advise all officers of your Division to afford Major Clausen the fullest possible cooperation. Inquiries made by Major Clausen should be answered fully and the persons interrogated should volunteer any information of which they may have knowledge concerning the subject of Major Clausen's inquiries.

In addition, copies of any papers required by Major Clausen, whether secret or top secret should be furnished him, any present directives to the contrary notwithstanding.

HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.

A true copy.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

TOP SECRET

[10]

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY SERVICE FORCES

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL

Washington 25, D. C.

Memorandum for Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD.

Subject: Unexplored Leads in Pearl Harbor Investigation.

1. In order to assist you in the investigation you are now making, I am suggesting herewith certain unexplored leads which, in my opinion, might advantageously be followed up in order to complete the general picture in this matter. The present memorandum merely contains suggestions and will not be construed as a directive or as in any way fixing the scope of your investigation.

2. In the War and Navy Departments in Washington, the following matters can be investigated:

a. Whether Kimmel notified the Navy Department and the War Department of the order to sink Jap subs, of the reasons for the order.

b. What was the naval condition of readiness at Pearl Harbor.

c. Whether Short or Kimmel sent any reconnaissance reports to Washington.

d. Whether Kimmel had any orders from Washington requiring a large part of the fleet to remain in harbor.

e. Whether Kimmel understood the term "defensive deployments" or wired back for its meaning.

f. Whether Kimmel replied to the 24 November, 27 November, and other Navy Department messages and if so, was the War Department furnished copies thereof.

g. Whether the June 1940 alert message to Herron was specific and indicative of an established War Department policy of being specific when war alerts were believed required by the situation.

h. Whether War Department manuals and war plans, current in 1941, authorized a Commanding General of an overseas Department to revise the estimate of the situation, without consulting with or reporting to the War Department.

i. Whether Short answered the Secretary of War's letter of 7 February 1941.

[11] j. The number of troops in Hawaii in late 1941, the state of their training and the possibility of continuing training under Alert 2 or 3.

k. The terms and origin of the Joint Action Agreement, if any, with Britain and the Netherlands, and whether Japan was officially advised of this agreement or discovered its existence.

1. Whether Short was sent official notice of the Joint Action Agreement or of the Roosevelt-Churchill July 1941 compact for a joint warning to Japan (Rep. 41).

3. Concerning the "magic" intercepts we should ascertain:

a. The exact date and time of first translation.

b. The reason for the apparent delay in translating or deciphering of some of the most vital messages.

c. Who got each message, when and in what form.

d. The evaluation made of them at the time and the degree of reliance placed thereon by the General Staff and by the Navy.

e. The origin of the "Budapest" intercept.

4. Significant details regarding the "Winds" intercept might be explored:

a. The original of the Navy Department message and translation, now probably part of the original Roberts Report records, or at least, questioning of Mr. Justice Roberts would possibly disclose how that Commission disposed of it.

b. The Navy's alleged delivery of two copies of the translation to the Army (Tr., Safford C. 133-135), as to just what procedure there was for delivery, as to who was responsible therefor, and who had a duty to check up on whether the transmission was received.

[12] c. Whether General Miles, Admiral Noyes, Colonel Bratton, or Captain Safford knew about the Anglo-Dutch-U. S. Joint Action Agreement, in which case they would have known that a "War with Britain" message would necessarily have involved the United States in war.

d. Whether the partial implementation "War with Britain" was brought to Admiral Stark's or General Marshall's attention, it being clear that the Chief

of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff did know of the Joint Action Policy.

e. Did the Navy in any way notify Admiral Kimmel or Commander Rochefort of the implementation intercept?

f. Did the Honolulu intercept stations independently receive the activating "Winds" message?

g. What was the significance of the other Japanese intercepts which the Board failed to examine?

h. Whether General (then Colonel) Fielder actually received the message directing him to contact Commander Rochefort, whether he did so, and whether there is substance to the hypothesis that he and Short were relying upon the warning they would expect to receive when the second or implementing "Winds" message would be intercepted, thus giving advance notice of hostilities.

Myron C. Cramer,
MYRON C. CRAMER,
Major General, USA,
The Judge Advocate General.

SECRET

[13]

WAR DEPARTMENT

Washington, 6 February 1945.

Memorandum for Army Personnel Concerned:

Pursuant to my directions and in accordance with my public statement of 1 December 1944, Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, is conducting for me the investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

You are directed to give Major Clausen access to all records, documents and information in your possession or under your control, and to afford him the fullest possible cooperation and assistance. Inquiries made by Major Clausen should be answered fully and freely and the persons interrogated should volunteer any pertinent information of which they may have knowledge. Copies of any papers required by Major Clausen should be furnished him.

HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.

SECRET

[14]

6 FEBRUARY 1945.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Pursuant to my directions and in accordance with my public statement of 1 December 1944, Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, is conducting for me the investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

Some of the additional information which seems to be material is believed to be available only through Navy personnel or Navy records. I have instructed Major Clasen to limit his inquiry strictly to matters which have a bearing on the part that Army personnel, organization, or action may have had in the disaster.

I will appreciate it if you will arrange to give Major Clausen access to all pertinent Navy records and information and afford him the opportunity of interviewing such Navy personnel as may be necessary, it being understood that he will comply strictly with the instructions I have stated above.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.

Above handed to Major Clausen 2/7/45 for delivery to Sec. Navy.

MO'B.

HON. JAMES V. FORRESTAL,
Secretary of the Navy,
Washington, D. C.

hbb/mob

A True Copy.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Major, JAGD.

SECRET

[15]

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Washington, 10 Feb. 1945.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have your letter of 6 February 1945 advising that Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, is conducting for you the investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and requesting that he be given access to all pertinent Navy records and information and be afforded the opportunity of interviewing such Navy personnel as necessary, it being understood that you have instructed him to limit his inquiry strictly to matters which have a bearing on that part that Army personnel, organization, or action may have had in the disaster.

I share your view that Public Law 339 of the 78th Congress, which directed that we "severally" investigate the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, authorize us to make available to each other information in our respective Departments relevant to our separate investigations. Accordingly, I am happy to comply with your request, and suggest that Major Clausen communicate with Lt. Commander John F. Sonnett, of my office, so that arrangements may be made to furnish the specific information which Major Clausen desires to obtain from the Navy Department.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES FORRESTAL

HON. HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War,
Washington, D. C.

SECRET

[16]

3 MARCH 1945.

Memorandum for The Adjutant General.
Subject: Request for Orders.

1. Reference is made to a Secret memorandum from the Secretary of War, dated 6 February 1945, copy of which is attached, concerning the investigation by Major H. C. Clausen for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

2. In connection with said mission and in pursuance of orders of Secretary of War, request is made for Orders directing Major Clausen to proceed on or about 12 March 1945: (a) to Langley Field, Virginia, (b) then to Honolulu, T. H., and (c) then return to Washington, D. C., and (d) authority to make such successive trips from Washington, D. C., and to travel to such other place or places, and to make such changes in said itinerary as may be necessary to accomplish said mission.

3. It is further requested that travel by military, naval or commercial aircraft, Army or Naval Transport, belligerent vessel or aircraft, commercial steamship, rail or any other means of transportation be authorized as necessary for the accomplishment of an emergency war mission, and that a baggage allowance of 75 pounds be authorized for travel by aircraft.

4. It is further requested that in lieu of subsistence flat per diem of \$7.00 be authorized while traveling and on duty for the period while away from Washington, D. C. required to complete this mission. Reference is made to the determination of the Secretary of War, dated 22 August 1944, that the thirty day limitation prescribed in War Department Circular 260, 1944, is not applicable in connection with temporary duty enjoined upon members of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and Officers on duty therewith.

/s/ H. C. Clausen,
H. C. CLAUSEN,
Major, JAGD.

Approved:

/s/ Harvey H. Bundy,
HARVEY H. BUNDY, for the Secretary of War.
/s/ Myron C. Cramer,
MYRON C. CRAMER,
The Judge Advocate General.

A true copy.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Major, JAGD.

[17]

RESTRICTED

AGPO-A 201 Clausen, Henry C.
(12 Mar 45)

EAD/bls/2231 Mu
Br. 76520

WAR DEPARTMENT,
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington 25, D. C., 14 March 1945.

Subject: Movement Orders.

To: Major Henry C. Clausen, 0907613, JAGD
4731 Munitions Building
Washington, D. C.

1. Major Henry C. Clausen, 0907613, JAGD, will proceed on or about 20 March 1945 from Washington, D. C., to San Francisco, California, on temporary duty of approximately three (3) days, thence to Fairfield-Suisun Army Air Field, Fairfield, California, reporting not later than 28 March 1945, to the Commanding Officer, 1504th AAF Base Unit for air transportation to Fort Shafter, T. H. Upon arrival at destination he will report to the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, for temporary duty of approximately two (2) months for the purpose of conducting investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. Upon the completion of this temporary duty he will return to his proper station, Washington, D. C.

2. Travel directed is necessary in the military service. 501-3 P 432-02, 03, 212/50425. Travel by air is directed (Par 3b (2) AR 55-120, Changes no. 9), and is necessary for the accomplishment of an emergency war mission, APR-2-331156-ASF. A baggage allowance of sixty-five (65) pounds, to include all personal effects, and an excess baggage allowance of ten (10) pounds, (official documents), is authorized while traveling by aircraft. Within continental United States the provisions of War Department Circular 260, 1944 apply; outside continental United States the provisions of War Department Circular 356, 1944, apply.

3. He is authorized to proceed to such additional places within the theater as may be necessary for the performance of this mission.

4. He will be equipped in accordance with Column M, WD Pamphlet No. 3S-6, "Itemized Baggage List", as desired. Small arms will be issued at the port of aerial embarkation in accordance with current instructions.

5. Special instructions: Temporary APO 4236, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California. Will comply with the provisions of Section 10, POR, pertaining to Medical Requirements. Typhus, cholera and bubonic plague inoculations will be administered to officer immediately upon receipt of orders. Designated as special official courier.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

E. A. DAVIS, *Adjutant General.*

[18] 3 Incls.

AG Ltr 4 July 1944

AG Form 43

Travel Book

Distribution:

Officer (10)

Officers' Br. Rec. Sec. AGO

Judge Advocate General, 2734 Mu.

Lt. Stump, 1C-931, The Pentagon.

APS, 4A-514, The Pentagon (2)

Port Postal Officer, SFPE, Fort Mason, Calif.

Assistant Ch/Staff, OPD, WDGS, 3B-354, The Pentagon

Mobilization Div. ASF, Foreign Travel Section, 4E-747, The Pentagon

P & T Officer, Hq. ATC, Rm. 1916 Gravelly Point, Va.

CG, USAFPOA, APO 958, c/o PM, San Francisco, California

Postal Officer, APO 958, c/o PM, San Francisco, Calif.

CO, 1504th AAF Base Unit, Fairfield-Suisun Army Air Field, Calif. (3)

SECRET

[19]

24 MARCH 1945.

Memorandum for the Commanding General, Pacific Ocean Areas.

Subject: Investigation Supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.

Pursuant to my directions and in accordance with my public statement of 1 December 1944, Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, is conducting for me the investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

In connection therewith Colonel Clausen is scheduled to arrive in your Command within the next thirty days.

It is desired that the fullest possible cooperation and assistance be given him, and that the senior G-2 General Officer of your Command be detailed to assist in the investigation, as Colonel Clausen may request, for the purpose of obtaining statements from Navy personnel and access to Navy records and information in accordance with arrangements which have been made between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy.

HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.

hec/es

A true copy.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

SECRET

[20]

24 MARCH 1945.

Memorandum for the Commanding General, Southwest Pacific Theater.

Subject: Investigation Supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.

Pursuant to my directions and in accordance with my public statement of 1 December 1944, Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, is conducting for me the investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

In connection therewith Colonel Clausen is scheduled to arrive in your Command within the next thirty days.

It is desired that the fullest possible cooperation and assistance be given him, and that the senior G-2 General Officer of your Command be detailed to assist in the investigation, as Colonel Clausen may request, for the purpose of obtaining statements from Navy personnel and access to Navy records and information in accordance with arrangements which have been made between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy.

HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.

hec/es

A true copy.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

[21]

WAR DEPARTMENT

ARMY SERVICE FORCES

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL

24 MARCH 1945.

Memorandum: ASF P&O (Maj. Duckett)

1. Request that so much of par. 1, Movement Orders 14 Mar. 45, (copy attached) as directs me to proceed from Washington, D. C. on or about 20 Mar. 45, and to report to Fairfield-Suisun Army Air Field not later than 28 Mar. 45, be amended to extend said dates respectively to leave Washington, D. C. on or about 26 Mar. 45, and to report to Fairfield-Suisun Army Air Field not later than 4 April 45. Also, if advisable, amend said orders to designate my correct rank.

2. Necessity for the foregoing extensions is additional time required to await certain developments in compliance with orders of the S/W.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lieutenant Colonel, JAGD.

Rm. 4741 Munitions
Ex. 78922

[22]

EAD/ED/ ed/2331 Mu

27 MARCH 1945.
77723AGPO-A 201-Clausen, Henry C
(27 Mar 45)AGO Personnel
Room 2323 Munitions

Officers

Assignment SPXPO-A

CO

1504 AAFBU

PP

FAIRFIELD-SUISUN AAF

FAIRFIELD, CALIFORNIA

Orders dated 14 March 1945 pertaining to Major Henry C. Clausen 0907613 JAGD by order SW are amended to direct him proceed on or about 26 March 45 from Washington, DC, and report to CO 1504 AAFBU FAIRFIELD-SUISUN AAF, Fairfield, Calif., not later than 4 April 45 end SPXPO-A ULIO TAG.

Official:

_____, *Adjutant General.*

SECRET

24 MAY 1945.

[23]

Memorandum for The Adjutant General.

Subject: Movement Orders to Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD.

1. Reference is made to movement Orders, dated 14 March 1945, to Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, and request therefor dated 3 March 1945.

2. Request is made for additional movement Orders to Colonel Clausen directing him to proceed on or about 30 May 1945 to Headquarters, SHAEF, and to such other points in the theater, and such other places and theaters, in such order and frequency as may be necessary for the purpose of conducting investigation in accordance with Secret instructions of the Secretary of War.

3. It is requested that the provisions of said prior request for Orders, dated 3 March 1945, be considered applicable hereto and that a one priority be assigned for air travel.

HARVEY H. BUNDY,
For the Secretary of War.

A true copy.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

RESTRICTED

EAD/laf/fcs/2323 Mun
Br. 76520

WAR DEPARTMENT,
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington 25, D. C., 25 May 1945

[24]

AGPO-A 201 Clausen, Henry C
(24 May 45)

Subject: Movement Orders

To: #Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, 0907613, JAGD

1. Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, 0907613, JAGD, will proceed on or about 30 May 1945 from Washington, D. C. to Headquarters, SHAEF, European Theater of Operations, Versailles, France, and to such other points in the theater, and such other places and theaters, in such order and frequency as may be necessary on temporary duty of approximately two (2) months for the purposes of conducting an investigation in accordance with instructions of the Secretary of War. He will report to the Commanding Officer, 503d Army Air Forces Base Unit, Air Annex #1, Room 1746, Gravelly Point, Washington, D. C. for processing and air transportation, upon completion of which, he will proceed from Washington, D. C. to Versailles, France, reporting upon arrival to the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, for duty. Upon completion of this temporary duty, he will return to his proper station, Washington, D. C.

2. Travel directed is necessary in the military service. 501-1 P 432-02, 03 212/50425. Travel by air (APR-1-354533-WDP-MAY) is directed (Par. 3b (2) AR 55-120, Changes No. 9), and is necessary for the accomplishment of an emerg-

ency war mission. A baggage allowance of sixty-five (65) pounds, to include all personal effects, and an excess baggage allowance of ten (10) pounds, is authorized while traveling by aircraft. Within the continental limits of the United States, provisions of Par. 25, AR 35-4820, 19 April 1945 apply; outside the continental limits of the United States, provisions of Par. 26, AR 35-4820, 19 April 1945, apply.

3. Authority is granted to make such changes in the above itinerary and to proceed to such additional places as may be necessary for the accomplishment of this mission.

4. Personnel will be equipped as desired in accordance with Column P, WD Pamphlet No. 38-6, "Itemized Baggage List." One (1) Pistol, caliber .45 will be issued at the aerial port of embarkation.

5. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: Temporary APO 4295, % Postmaster, New York, New York. Will comply with provisions of Section 10, POR, pertaining to Medical Requirement. Typhus inoculations will be administered immediately upon receipt of orders. Designated special official courier.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

CAPT. E. A. DAVIS, AGO,
Adjutant General.

Officers Br Overseas Assignment Sec

[25] 3 Incls:

AG Ltr 4 Jul 44

AG Form #43

Travel Book

Distribution:

Officer (10)

Offs' Br., Rec Sec, AGO, 1628 Mun

APS, 4A-514, Pentagon

OIC, Emb APO, 464 Lexington Ave., NY, NY (2)

Lt. Stump, 1C-931, Pentagon

CO, 503d AAFBU, WPAAE, 1746, Air Annex #1, Gravelly Pt, DC (3)

Judge Advocate General, 2734 Mun

Destination Commander:

SECRET

[26]

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Referring to your letter dated 10 February 1945, I wish to thank you for the arrangements made whereby Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, has had access to certain pertinent Navy records and interviewed certain Navy personnel.

I have also been happy to comply with your request that appropriate Navy representatives similarly be given Army information which is relevant to your investigation, it being understood, of course, that the Navy inquiry will be limited to matters which have a bearing on the part that Navy personnel, organization or action may have had in the disaster.

Sincerely yours,

_____, Secretary of War.

Honorable JAMES FORRESTAL,

Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.

A true copy.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,

Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

hhh/mob

[27]

7 AUGUST 1945.

Memorandum for the Adjutant General:

Reference is made to Movement Orders to Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, dated 25 May 1945.

It is requested that so much of paragraph one thereof as sets forth period of temporary duty as approximately two months be amended to read "four months."

HARVEY H. BUNDY,

Special Assistant to the Secretary of War.

A true copy.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,

Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

[28]

RESTRICTED

RHO/laf/mm/2323 Mun
Br. 76520WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE

Washington, D. C., 11 August 1945.

AGPO-A 201—Clausen, Henry C.

(7 Aug. 45.)

Subject: Amendment of Movement Orders,

To: Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, O-907613, JAGD.

So much of Classified Letter Orders AGPO-A 201 Clausen, Henry C. (24 May 45. Subject: Movement Orders 25 May 1945 pertaining to Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, O-907613, JAGD as reads: "Temporary Duty of approximately two (2) months" be amended to read: "Temporary Duty of approximately four (4) months".

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

E. A. DAVIS, *Adjutant General.*

Distribution:

Officer (10)

Offs' Br Rec Sec AGO, Rm 1528 Mun

APS, Rm 4-A 514, Pentagon

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Judge Advocate General, Rm 2734, Mun.

Destination Commander:

[29] OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR REGARDING THE PEARL HARBOR
DISASTER

By Joint Resolution of the Congress, approved June 13, 1944, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy were severally directed to proceed with an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts might justify. In order to meet the wishes of Congress as expressed in this resolution, I have conducted such an investigation. In order to assist me to this end, there was appointed by order dated July 8, 1944, a Board of three general officers which was directed "to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on 7 December 1941, and to make such recommendations as it might deem proper."

On December 1, 1944, I made a public statement of my decision in this matter as follows:

"This Army Pearl Harbor Board has conducted an extensive and painstaking investigation. It has held hearings in Hawaii, San Francisco, and Washington. It has examined a total of 151 witnesses and received many exhibits. I have read its report and reviewed the recorded evidence. The Judge Advocate General of the Army, at my direction, has also examined the report and the record and has given me fully the benefit of his views.

"I recognize the importance to any individual concerned of having a decision taken as to what, if any, action is to be instituted against him and, after weighing all the considerations, I am clear that the public interest as well as justice and fairness will best be served by a statement of my present conclusions. So far as they now may be made public, consonant with the public interest, my conclusions are as follows:

"The Army Pearl Harbor Board, although it recommended no disciplinary or other action, concluded that there were several officers in the field and in the War Department who did not perform their duties with the necessary skill or exercise the judgment which was required under the circumstances. On the recorded evidence, I agree with some but not all of the Board's conclusions.

"So far as the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department is concerned, I am of the opinion that his errors of judgment were of such a nature as to demand his relief from a Command status. This was done on January 11, 1942, and in itself is a serious result for any officer with a long record of excellent service, and conscientious as I believe General Short to be. In my judgment, or the evidence now recorded, it is sufficient action.

"Furthermore, I am satisfied that proper steps were taken to correct such inadequacies of either personnel or organization as were shown to exist either in the War Department or in the field at the time of the Pearl Harbor disaster. My conclusion is that under all the circumstances the evidence now recorded does not warrant the institution of any further proceedings against any officer in the Army.

"In accordance with the opinion of The Judge Advocate General, I have decided that my own investigation should be further continued until all the facts are made as clear as possible and until the testimony of [30] every witness in possession of material facts can be obtained, and I have given the necessary directions to accomplish this result. Some of the testimony may be much delayed where witnesses are engaged in combat in active theaters of operation. My present decision will be reviewed when the investigation has been finally completed.

"Finally, I am absolutely clear that it would be highly prejudicial to the successful prosecution of the war and the safety of American lives to make public during the war the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board or the record on which it is based."

Since December 1, I have continued my own investigation. At my direction, Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen of the Office of the Judge Advocate General has made an extensive further examination of witnesses. Colonel Clausen was Assistant Recorder of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and as such had an intimate knowledge of the facts. I have reviewed the additional evidence available and I have reviewed my earlier decision. I am satisfied that this decision as to the action to be taken was correct.

Until the end of the hostilities with Japan extreme care was necessary not to disclose information which was in the hands of the War Department and especially the sources of our information, of which there were many, including the Intelligence Divisions of the Army and Navy, the F. B. I., and others. From these same sources there came to the Government additional information which resulted in saving of thousands of American lives during the war with Japan.

The end of hostilities now makes it possible for me to make public much more fully my conclusions and the reasons for my conclusions without such serious danger to the public security as to outweigh the desirability of such publication. It is still not in the public interest to disclose sources of information. I have directed that all of the Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board be made public except that part which would reveal sources of secret information. The conclusions of the Board are fully set forth in the part which is now made public. The War Department will make available to appropriate Committees of Congress the full reports and the record of the testimony.

My conclusions are as follows:

I

The primary and immediate responsibility for the protection of the Island of Oahu and Pearl Harbor insofar as the Army was concerned rested upon the Commanding Officer of the Hawaiian Department, Lieutenant General Walter C. Short. It has been and still is the prevailing policy and practice of the General Staff of the United States Army to choose with care as commanding officers of the various theaters men whose record and experience indicate their capabilities for the command and to place upon them the responsibility for the performance of their mission with as little interference from the central Army authorities in Washington as possible. This policy of decentralized responsibility in our Army has been found to produce the best results, has been followed successfully throughout the war, and it is still being followed in all the various theaters of operation. Thus each theater commander is charged with the preparation of his own local defense plan, including the working out of any defense operations with the local Naval authorities. Such plans are submitted to the appropriate division of the General Staff in Washington and are subject to any changes or modifications that might emanate from that source. The primary responsibility for such plans and their execution, however, rests on the commanding officer familiar with the local [31] situation and conditions. Before December 7, 1941, detailed plans for the defense of the Hawaiian Department had been devised and worked out by General Short as well as a Joint Agreement with the local Naval authorities for joint action in the event of an emergency, and he and the Navy commanding officer had the primary responsibility of putting into effect these plans or such portions thereof as the occasion

demand. This last, however, had not been done at the time of the Japanese attack.

I feel that during the year 1941, and particularly during October and until the latter part of November, General Short was repeatedly advised of the critical events which were developing. I find that he was clearly warned on November 27 by the appropriate authorities in Washington that a break in diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan might occur at any time, that an attack by Japan on the United States might occur, and that hostilities were possible at any moment. I find that he was informed that the defense of his command was to be regarded as paramount to all other considerations and that he was specifically directed to take such measures of reconnaissance as he deemed necessary. In addition to the information received directly from Washington through both Army and Navy sources, General Short received continuous reports from his own Intelligence Section, which clearly revealed the seriousness of the situation. General Short himself knew that it was traditionally the policy for a responsible commanding officer to anticipate and to be prepared for the worst form of possible attack, and he had received and approved military estimates from his own staff as well as from the Chief of Staff to the effect that a surprise raid by air and submarine constituted the principal perils to Hawaii.

I do not find that there was any information in the possession of the War Department and which was not made available to General Short which would have modified the essence of the above information which was sent to him or which would have affected or increased the duties of vigilance and alertness thus already imposed upon him. The available information might have given him a clearer picture of the increasing tenseness of the situation and as later pointed out I believe that the War Department would have carried out its duties more adequately if General Short had been given more complete information, but I find that he was amply warned for the performance of his paramount duty of being alert against a surprise air attack by Japan.

I find that he failed in the light of the information which he had received adequately to alert his command to the degree of preparedness which the situation demanded; and that this failure contributed measurably to the extent of the disaster, although much damage probably would have resulted from the attack in any event. I find that he failed to use fully the means at hand for reconnaissance, especially the radar air warning service, which was of prime necessity; that he failed to ascertain from the Navy the extent of its reconnaissance or to collaborate with it to the end that more adequate reconnaissance should be secured. I find that he failed to have his anti-aircraft defenses sufficiently manned or supplied with ready ammunition as the situation demanded.

This failure resulted not from indolence or indifference or willful disobedience of orders but from a vital error of judgment, viz: the failure to comprehend the necessities of the situation in the light of the warnings and information which he had received. He states that to put into effect a different degree of alertness than he actually did would have interfered with the training program which he was carrying out in various activities, and would have involved the danger of alarming the population, against which he had been cautioned. In weighing such considerations he entirely lost sight of the fact that the defense of his command and station against Japan was his paramount duty.

[32] The underlying cause of this error of judgment was General Short's confidence that Japan would not then attack Pearl Harbor. In fairness to him it must be borne in mind that this belief was shared in by almost everyone concerned including his superior officers in the War Department in Washington. He was undoubtedly influenced in such a belief by the then prevailing psychology which completely underestimated the Japanese military capabilities and particularly the advance which they had made in the use of aircraft. General Short also knew that the Naval command at Hawaii, which he regarded as being better informed than he because of their facilities and the widespread nature of their operations, was confident that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was most unlikely. The information which was being received of Japanese naval activity pointed to operations in southeastern Asia, the Netherlands East Indies, or the Philippines.

Furthermore, in Hawaii the danger of sabotage was stressed because of the large Japanese population, and General Short was expressly warned by the War Department against this danger. But the warning was coupled with a warning also against the danger of hostile action in general. General Short relies upon the fact that the War Department took no exception to his report of November 27, 1941, to the effect that he was "alerted against sabotage." He urges that this

should be regarded as a tacit approval of his failure to alert against other dangers. I think it is probably true that the emphasis on sabotage in several War Department warnings and the Department's caution against alarming the civilian population, coupled with this failure to comment on Short's report of November 27, confirmed him in his conviction that he had chosen the correct form of alert and might disregard all others.

But these matters, although they may make his action more understandable, do not serve to exonerate him for his failure to be fully alert and prepared against an air attack. He well knew that an air attack on Pearl Harbor, even if improbable, was possible. Yet he ordered an alert which he himself had prepared for use only in case of "no threat from without." Protection against the possibility of such an attack was his own definite responsibility.

To sum up the situation tersely, General Short was warned by Washington that there was immediate danger both of an attack from without by Japan and of an attack from within by sabotage. This warning required him to be alert against both forms of danger. He chose to concentrate himself so entirely upon a defense against sabotage as to leave himself more completely exposed to an attack from without than if there had been no alert at all. He so concentrated his planes as not only to make them an easy target for an attack from without but to require several hours to get any substantial number of them into the air for defense.

To such an error of judgment it is no excuse that he relied upon assurances from another service, even though he thought that that service was better informed than he was as to the disposition of the Japanese fleet. He was the responsible defender of the outpost of Hawaii. He had no right entirely to subordinate his duty to be prepared against what he knew to be the most dangerous form of attack on that outpost to the opinion of another service.

Nor had he any right, after the clear and explicit warning of the War Department of a possible attack from without, to assume from mere inference that such a warning had been entirely withdrawn and that he was thereby relieved from his independent responsibility as a theater commander.

I have reviewed the conclusions reached with regard to General Short in my statement of December 1, 1944, and in my judgment the additional investigation does not warrant any change in the conclusions drawn therein, nor call for any action beyond that which has already been taken.

II

[33] Such duties as the War Department in Washington had in the supervision of the defense of Hawaii devolved primarily upon what was then known as the War Plans Division of the General Staff. This was the division of the General Staff specifically charged with the war plans and operations, and messages to or from the theater commanders were regularly handled or approved by it. The War Plans Division was in charge of an Assistant Chief of Staff and under him various officers had specially assigned duties.

The Intelligence Section of the General Staff (G-2) also had duties of collecting and analyzing information and transmitting information to other sections of the War Department and to the theater commanders.

I find as heretofore stated that the messages sent to General Short gave him adequate information as to the state of the negotiations with the Japanese and the development of the situation; that he was warned that Japanese future action was unpredictable; that hostile action was possible at any moment; and that no consideration was to be permitted to jeopardize his defense. He was also expressly directed to take reconnaissance measures—the all-important measure to be taken at the time. Furthermore, as heretofore stated, I do not think that any special and detailed warnings against sabotage should have been considered by General Short as justifying his decision that an alert against any possible enemy action was not also his duty.

There was certain information in the War Department which was not sent to General Short and which if forwarded might have sharpened General Short's attention or emphasized further the imminence of war. Some part of this information was sent to Admiral Kimmel by the Navy. It was the rule that all such information should be exchanged between the Army and Navy at Pearl Harbor, and the War Department had a right to believe that this information communicated to Admiral Kimmel was also available to General Short. While Admiral Kimmel and General Short were on very friendly terms and in frequent communication, the exchange of information as well as consultation in other respects at Hawaii between the Army and Navy was inadequate.

The information available to the War Department on or before December 7, 1941, which was not passed on to General Short included the following: information available November 17 and 22 to the effect that the Japanese Government insisted that the negotiations for a peaceful settlement be terminated by November 25, 1941, later extended to November 29, 1941; information available December 6 and 7 to the effect that Nomura and Kuruu were to reply to the United States that Japan would yield no further; and information available the morning of December 7 which did not reach General Short until after the disaster that the reply was to be delivered to the representatives of the United States at 1:00 P. M., December 7, 1941, and that the remaining cipher and code machines in the Japanese Embassy at Washington were to be destroyed.

The Army Pearl Harbor Board concluded that the War Department had earlier in its possession other evidence which indicated that war with Japan was imminent at a definite time and that this information was not available to General Short. The principal basis for this conclusion by the Board, however, was that the War Department had information through secret sources of information that the Japanese diplomatic representatives in London, Washington and elsewhere had been ordered to destroy their codes and papers. The additional investigation shows that officers on General Short's staff also had this information and had given it to him prior to December 7, 1941. It should be borne in mind also that General Short had been [34] fully advised by the War Department that war with Japan was imminent and might commence at any time.

The War and Navy Departments also had certain information which was not forwarded to General Short to the effect that the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu was reporting to Tokyo ship movements and dispositions in Pearl Harbor. Other somewhat similar information was being given to Tokyo by Japanese Consulates in other ports. This was apparently considered by officers in the War Department as merely a part of the enemy's general plan to keep track of all ships of the American Navy as far as possible.

Information was received by the War Department on December 6, 1941, as to what the Japanese reply to the settlement overtures of the United States would be and that this reply indicated an immediate severance of diplomatic relations. There is no dispute, however, that General Marshall did not get this information until the morning of December 7. An officer, then connected with G-2, War Department, testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board that on December 6 he personally delivered this message to the Secretary of the General Staff for the Chief of Staff, also to the Executive Officer for the Chief of the War Plans Division, and to the Executive Officer for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. In the additional investigation conducted by Colonel Clausen subsequent to the findings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, the witness corrected his testimony and testified that the only message he delivered on the night of December 6 was to the duty officer for the Secretary of State. Other evidence from the additional investigation showed that the subordinate officer in G-2 who received the message on December 6 did not deliver it to the Army persons mentioned until after 9:00 A. M. on the morning of December 7.

When the Chief of Staff received the above mentioned information on the morning of December 7, together with information which had since arrived to the effect that the Japanese envoys were to deliver the reply to the American Government at 1:00 P. M. and the Japanese Embassy was to destroy its remaining cipher and code machines and secret papers, he sent to the overseas commanders a message giving these latest developments. General Marshall gave directions that this message be immediately dispatched to the theater commanders. This was the message, which in the case of General Short, did not arrive until after the attack.

Another item of information in the possession of the War Department which General Short denies receiving was that the Japanese had circulated from Tokyo about November 20, 1941, to their representatives abroad, a plan to the effect that in case of severance of diplomatic relations or war with the United States, Great Britain or Russia a certain signal in the form of a false weather report would be broadcast in a news message and that all code papers were then to be destroyed. I find that this information was available to General Short or his command prior to December 7, 1941. The evidence as to whether the agreed signal indicating severance of relations or war with the United States was subsequently given and made known to the War Department is confusing and contradictory. No written evidence of such a signal has been found. But in any event, information was available to General Short of the orders to destroy codes as above discussed.

With regard to the information available in the War Department, I believe the War Plans Division made a mistake in not transmitting to General Short more information than it did. A keener and more imaginative appreciation on the part of some of the officers in the War and Navy Departments of the significance of some of the information might have led to a suspicion of an attack specifically on Pearl Harbor. I do not think that certain officers in the War Department [35] functioned in these respects with sufficient skill. At all times it must be borne in mind, however, that it is easy to criticize individuals in the light of hind-sight, and very difficult to recreate fairly the entire situation and information with which the officers were required to deal at the time of the event.

Again, as I have pointed out, General Short in response to a message which had been sent out containing a warning of possible hostilities and a request for a report of action taken, had sent a message to the War Department which was susceptible of the interpretation that he was on the alert against sabotage *only* and not on the alert against an air raid or other hostile action. While this interpretation was not necessarily to be had from the wording of his message, nevertheless a keener sense of analysis and a more incisive comparison of the messages exchanged would have invited further inquiry by the War Plans Division of General Short, and his failure to go on the necessary alert might well have been discovered. The Chief of this division and certain of his subordinates knew that a report of the measures taken by General Short had been asked for. General Short's reply was brought to the attention of the Chief of the division. A clear and satisfactory reply should have been required. This was not done and a more efficient functioning of the division would have demanded that a careful inquiry as to the meaning of General Short's message be made and no room for ambiguity permitted.

It must clearly be borne in mind that in November and December 1941, the responsibilities of the War Plans Division covered many fields and many theaters. Their preoccupation with the theaters most likely to be threatened, such as the Philippines toward which the Japanese activities then appeared to be pointed, may be subject to criticism in the light of the subsequent disaster, but it is understandable. All signs pointed to an attack in that direction and they were exercising particular care with respect to that theater. Their conduct must be viewed in an entirely different light from that of the theater commander, such as General Short, who was like a sentinel on post and whose attention and vigilance must be entirely concentrated on the single position which he has been chosen to defend and whose alertness must not be allowed to be distracted by consideration of other contingencies in respect to which he is not responsible. Under all circumstances, I find nothing in the evidence as now recorded which warrants the institution of any further proceedings against any officer in the War Plans Division.

Since Pearl Harbor, the War Plans Division has been completely reorganized and the officers involved in the matters in question have either died or received other assignments where they have already distinguished themselves in the performance of important duties in the field. I am satisfied that proper steps were taken to correct such inadequacies of either personnel or organization as were shown to exist either in the War Department or in the field at the time of the Pearl Harbor disaster.

III

The War Plans Division like the other divisions and activities of the General Staff in Washington was under the general direction and supervision of the Chief of Staff, General Marshall. Evidently for this reason the Army Pearl Harbor Board has been led to criticize the Chief of Staff as being responsible for some of the shortcomings of the officers of the General Staff which I have just enumerated. In my opinion, this criticism is entirely unjustified. It arises from a fundamental misconception of the duties of the Chief of Staff and of his relations with the divisions and activities of the General Staff. It is not the function of the Chief of Staff specifically to direct and personally supervise the execution in detail of the duties of the various sections of the General Staff. His paramount duty is to advise the President and the Secretary of War, and to make plans for [36] and supervise the organization, equipment, and training of a great army for a global war; to advise on, and himself to make, decisions regarding basic problems of military strategy in the many possible theaters in which the war might develop and in other fundamental and broad military problems which confront the United States. It would hope-

lessly cripple the performance of these great and paramount duties should a Chief of Staff allow himself to become immersed in administrative details by which the plans for defense are carried out in our many outposts.

It is true that the failure of any part of the General Staff to perform its duties efficiently may be of such a kind or reach such an extent as to become the responsibility of the Chief of Staff for not having established a more effective organization. But I do not find any such situation in this case. The scattered and individual errors which I have criticized in respect to the Pearl Harbor disaster were not of a kind or extent to imply any general inefficiency in a Staff which was performing the heaviest duties with great ability and with subsequent results which have produced some of the finest pages of the history of the war. The shortcomings I have pointed out thus cannot in any fairness be attributed to the Chief of Staff. On the contrary, throughout this matter I believe that he acted with his usual great skill, energy, and efficiency.

IV

The conclusions which I have stated herein as to the responsibilities and errors of General Short are in general accord with the conclusions of both the Roberts Commission in their report of January 23, 1942* and the Army Pearl Harbor Board. My conclusions as to the responsibilities and errors of the War Plans Division are to a substantial extent, but not entirely, in accord with the conclusions of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. The Roberts Commission did not go into details in respect to these responsibilities. My conclusion as to the responsibility of the Chief of Staff is, as I have heretofore stated, at variance with the conclusion of the Army Pearl Harbor Board but it is in entire agreement with the conclusions of the Roberts Commission. Of the correctness of my conclusion in this last respect, I have not the slightest doubt.

V

In the conclusions of the Board there were no other individuals charged with responsibilities who were criticized except for a suggestion which might be construed as a criticism of Secretary Hull. It is suggested that in his conduct of the negotiations with the Japanese envoys a different procedure might have prolonged the negotiations until such time as the Army and Navy were better prepared for hostile action. Not only do I strongly disagree with what amounts at best only to a conjecture, but I feel that the Board's comment in this respect was uncalled for and not within the scope of their proper inquiry.

VI

There has been omitted from the press release of the text of the Army Pearl Harbor Board report that portion which dealt solely with the related investigation of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr. My findings as to Colonel Wyman, as expressed on December 1, 1944, were as follows:

[37] "I have reviewed the results of this investigation. I do not find from this review that the Pearl Harbor disaster was in any way contributed to or caused by any alleged misconduct, neglect or disloyalty on the part of Rohl, the Hawaiian Constructors, the organization with which he was connected, Colonel Wyman, or others directing construction activities in Hawaii, and I do not find that there is any evidence that Rohl or anyone else directing such construction gave any information to the enemy."

The additional investigation conducted by Colonel Clausen has disclosed no further evidence which would in any way modify my decision.

I also stated on December 1, 1944, that "as to other alleged misconduct and neglect of Colonel Wyman and others in construction matters, I have referred the question of the commencing of any proceedings to the Under Secretary of War and The Judge Advocate General." Until those officials are ready to report, I deem it inappropriate to make public the portions of the Army Pearl Harbor Board report insofar as it relates to Colonel Wyman.

*This Commission consisted of Mr. Justice Roberts; Admiral W. H. Stanley, Retired; Admiral J. M. Reeves, Retired; Major General Frank R. McCoy, Retired; and Major General Joseph T. McNarney.